paraphrase in simple english:

Question

In our view, the above versions of the precautionary principle are not
vulnerable to the standard objections to positive precautionary principles.
They are not unduly conservative, they differ meaningfully from
standard cost‐benefit analyses and, if properly applied, they do not
lead to paradoxical conclusions. This is not to say that these forms of
the precautionary principle are above question. However, given their
prima facie plausibility, at a minimum they warrant further analysis
In this section, we want to draw attention to a general difficulty
associated with applying the precautionary principle in the context
of GGE. It might seem that insofar as GGE carries plausible and significant
risks to future generations, most plausible versions of the
precautionary principle would weigh against pursuing GGE. This
is not necessarily the case, as failing to pursue GGE may also carry
plausible and significant risks to future generations.
As described at the beginning of the article, one possible application
of GGE is to eradicate recessive mutations and disease‐predisposing
alleles. This would significantly improve the health of future
generations; correspondingly, failing to use GGE for these purposes
might indirectly threaten the health of future generations. In addition,
consider a more direct argument for GGE, based on an argument
recently advanced by Russell Powell: that unless we engage in
GGE the population’s genetic health will gradually decline, leaving
future generations increasingly reliant on conventional medical
technology. This is because (Powell argues) advances in conventional
medicine have largely freed humankind from the pressures of natural
selection, thereby leaving the human gene pool vulnerable to the
accumulation of deleterious mutations. The risks of failing to engage
in GGE are twofold. Firstly, future generations may need to dedicate
substantial resources to correct for their poor state of genetic
health, thereby tying up resources that could have been used to promote
human well‐being in other ways. Secondly, as future generations
become increasingly dependent on medical technology to
achieve current levels of well‐being, they will also become increasingly
vulnerable to catastrophic harm should conventional medicines
become less readily available – for example, during a hypothetical
future period of economic and political collapse. On Powell’s view,
GGE presents a valuable means of maintaining current levels of genetic
health and shielding future generations from potentially catastrophic
threats to their well‐being.58
If Powell’s analysis is correct, pursuing and failing to pursue GGE
carry the sort of risks that might trigger (most of) the above precautionary
principles. Both courses of action carry an extremely bad worst‐case
scenario; both threaten to render public health less secure; both might
cause people to fall below a sufficient level of well‐being; and both plausibly
violate negative obligations to future generations.Viewed this way, the precautionary principles discussed in this article do not provide
any clear guidance on whether GGE should be carried out.
In saying this, we are not making the well‐worn point that the
precautionary principle can often be deployed both for and against
the same policy. Although some versions of the precautionary principle
can be used this way, these versions of the principle are vulnerable
to the incoherence objection described earlier in this article and
should therefore be rejected. Our argument is that the risks of pursuing
and failing to pursue GGE seem largely symmetrical, which
makes it practically difficult to determine what course of action the
precautionary principle would ultimately recommend. It is therefore
an open question whether the precautionary principle would weigh
against GGE or whether it might (contrary to most commentators’
expectations) actually support GGE.60
This is partly due to our limited understanding of the risks of
GGE. As gene editing technologies are developed further it will become
more possible to quantify the relevant risks, which may determine
the appropriate way to deploy the precautionary principle. For
example, the risks associated with off‐target mutations will become
better understood as gene editing becomes more widely used in different
cell types. The risks of on‐target mutations will become better
understood as we understand more about genetics and genotypephenotype
relation. The risks of accumulating germline mutations
due to modern medicine could be better quantified using intergenerational
studies to look at the rate at which mutations are actually
accumulating and where in the genome they are accumulating.
Therefore, although it is currently difficult to apply most versions of
the precautionary principle to GGE, this is partly due to epistemic
limitations that may be overcome in coming years.61
Furthermore, the precautionary principle does offer relatively
clear guidance on one point: prima facie, precautionary principles
provide reasons to prefer some applications of GGE over others.
Specifically, the precautionary principles described in this article
provide a reason to favour GGE research focused on maintaining
genetic health, enhancing the human species’ long‐term viability62
or negating existential risks63 over research aimed at modifying cosmetic
traits and perhaps also over research aimed at promoting
health beyond some sufficiently high level of well‐being. The latter
practices – but not the former – would expose future generations to
unbalanced long‐term risks of harm in exchange for short‐term
benefits.

Answer 1

We believe that the versions of the precautionary principle mentioned above do not have the usual weaknesses found in other precautionary principles. They are not overly cautious, are different from standard cost-benefit analyses, and, if used correctly, do not lead to confusing results. However, this doesn’t mean these versions are perfect or beyond criticism. They seem reasonable and deserve more examination.

In this section, we want to highlight a general problem when applying the precautionary principle to gene editing for future generations (GGE). It may appear that since GGE has significant and believable risks for future generations, the precautionary principle would advise against it. But this isn't always true; avoiding GGE can also pose serious risks to future generations.

For instance, one possible use of GGE is to eliminate harmful genetic mutations and diseases, which would significantly improve the health of future generations. Not using GGE for this purpose could indirectly harm their health. Additionally, Russell Powell suggests that if we don't pursue GGE, the genetic health of the population will decline over time, causing future generations to rely more on conventional medicine. He argues that modern medicine has reduced the effects of natural selection, allowing harmful genetic mutations to accumulate. Ignoring GGE can lead to two main risks: future generations might have to spend a lot of resources fixing their genetic problems instead of using them for other benefits, and they would be more vulnerable to major problems if medical technologies were no longer available, like during a crisis.

If Powell is right, both pursuing and not pursuing GGE carry significant risks that might trigger the precautionary principles mentioned earlier. Both options have serious worst-case scenarios, threaten public health, and could harm overall well-being for future generations. When looking at it this way, the precautionary principles don't clearly indicate whether GGE should be pursued.

We're not just repeating the common idea that the precautionary principle can be used for and against the same policy. Some versions can indeed be used this way, but those are often criticized for being inconsistent and should be dismissed. Our point is that the risks of pursuing or not pursuing GGE are similar, making it tricky to decide what the precautionary principle would suggest. It's not clear if it would argue against GGE or surprisingly support it.

This confusion partly comes from our limited understanding of the risks associated with GGE. As gene editing technology advances, we may better quantify these risks, which could affect how the precautionary principle is applied. For example, we will better understand the risks of unintended mutations as gene editing becomes more common. Similarly, we will learn more about the genetic risks as we study genetics and how genes relate to traits. We could also better quantify the risks of accumulating harmful mutations due to modern medicine by studying how mutations build up over generations.

So, even though applying the precautionary principle to GGE is challenging now, we might overcome these knowledge gaps in the future. Furthermore, the precautionary principle does offer some clear advice: it suggests favoring certain uses of GGE, especially those focused on maintaining genetic health and reducing long-term risks, over those aimed at changing cosmetic traits or enhancing health beyond a reasonable level. The latter could expose future generations to more long-term harm for the sake of short-term benefits, while the former would not.