political approach to human rights, such as the one I have articulated, may seem to have no room for the notion of dignity. This appearance, however, is not quite correct. While it is true that, on my view, definitions of human rights should stay clear of references to inherent dignity, nothing I have said speaks against drawing a conceptual connection between human rights and status dignity. The present section is devoted to developing precisely that connection.

Human rights, from a political perspective, do not articulate standards for respecting the dignity of individuals qua human beings. Instead, they set out:
(i) universal standards for respecting the passive status dignity of subjects of sovereign authorities qua subjects; and
(ii) universal standards that sovereign authorities must respect in order not to lose their own active status dignity qua sovereign authorities.
This way of conceptualising human rights, and their connection to status dignity, is revisionary in two respects:
(1) It implies that normative standards of dignity may be held not only by virtue of one’s intrinsic or inherent properties (eg being a sentient creature; being a creature capable of autonomy, being a creature with inherent dignity), but also by virtue of one’s relational properties (eg being the subject of a sovereign authority).
(2) It implies that not only individuals, but also corporate entities—like states—may have status dignity.
Undoubtedly, (1) and (2) will breed scepticism about the viability and merits of the proposed way of conceptualising the relationship between dignity and human rights. Upon further scrutiny, however, implications (1) and (2) are far from sinister; in fact, they are quite plausible and reinforce the role of human

Please provide subjective debate on this passage

1 answer

The passage presents a political approach to human rights that distances itself from the conventional notion of inherent dignity. This perspective can incite a multifaceted debate, touching on philosophical, ethical, and practical implications of redefining the relationship between human rights and dignity in terms of status.

On one hand, the argument for grounding human rights in status dignity—based on relational properties rather than inherent qualities—offers a pragmatic view of rights in the context of state sovereignty and governance. This approach seems to echo the realities of international relations, where states, as corporate entities, have their own dignities that need to be preserved to maintain order and prevent chaos. The structure of modern governance is inherently tied to sovereignty, and rights perceived through this framework provide a mechanism for accountability among states while preserving the social contract between citizens and their governments.

However, detractors may argue that focusing solely on status dignity could undermine the moral foundations of human rights, which traditionally rests on the idea of inherent dignity as a universal attribute of all human beings. By suggesting that rights can be derived from relational properties associated with sovereign authority, there is a risk of relegating individual human dignity to a subordinate position, dependent on the recognition and actions of states. Critics might claim this could lead to abuses, as it opens the door for justifying violations of rights if a state determines the person’s status is such that dignity is not applicable.

Additionally, implication (1), which extends dignity to relational properties, raises questions about inclusivity and intersectionality. If dignity becomes contingent upon one’s relationship to sovereign authority, marginalized groups—who may lack power or recognition within their own states—could find themselves further disenfranchised. This could perpetuate systemic inequalities, diminishing the universality of human rights that many advocate for. An individual’s worth would hinge not on their inherent characteristics but on how those characteristics are appraised by authorities, potentially leading to a societal hierarchy based on status.

On the point of implication (2), although having corporate entities like states recognized as possessing status dignity may encourage responsibility on the part of governments, it also poses challenges to accountability. If human rights become viewed mainly within the context of state interests and dignity, the risk arises that states might prioritize their own dignity over the rights of individuals. This could foster a culture where violations of human rights by states are overlooked or justified, as the state seeks to preserve its dignity at the expense of the dignity of its citizens.

Ultimately, this political approach to human rights, while theoretically appealing and grounded in practical realities, calls for careful consideration of its potential ramifications. Striking a balance between the recognition of status dignity within the constructs of sovereignty and the essential, intrinsic dignity of individuals appears crucial. The challenge lies in ensuring that the shift in focus from inherent dignity does not lead us into a moral quagmire where the rights of the individual are merely secondary to the needs and dignity of the state.

Thus, while the arguments presented in the passage hold value and plausibility, their acceptance hinges on addressing the foundational concerns surrounding individual dignity and ensuring that human rights remain truly universal, rather than conditional or state-centric.