Section 4 of the Interpretation Act provides for the statutory method of computation of days. According to this section, where a period of time is prescribed by a statute for the doing of any act, this period shall be calculated by excluding the first day and including the last day, unless the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or public holiday, in which case the period shall end on the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or public holiday.
In terms of case law, the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of State v Venter and Others (2002) held that the calculation of time in terms of the Interpretation Act is mandatory and applies to all statutory provisions prescribing time limits for the doing of an act unless the statute in question provides for a different method of calculation.
Applying the statutory method of computation of days to John's case, the period for lodging an appeal in terms of section 27(2) of the Act commenced on 6 February 2009 (the day after the Council's decision was communicated to him) and ended on 9 March 2009. The last day for lodging the appeal was a Monday, and therefore, it is included in the computation.
Therefore, John has lodged the appeal within the prescribed period and in compliance with the statutory method of computation of days.
John lodges an appeal in terms of section 27(2) of the Act on 9 March 2009.
The Council informed him of its decision on 5 February 2009. Explain in detail
the statutory method of computation of days (section 4 of the Interpretation
Act) with reference to case law. Has John lodged the appeal in time?
1 answer