Question

What was the “missile gap” identified in the 1950s?
The USSR, according to a report, was ahead in ICBM technology.
The Soviets had a lot fewer ICBMs than the United States.
The distance ICBMs flew between continents was referred to as a “gap.”
The “gap” referred to the distance between deployed missiles on the ground.

Answer 1

Short answer: The “missile gap” was the fear in the late 1950s that the Soviet Union had a lead over the United States in operational intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) — i.e., a perceived numerical and/or qualitative advantage in strategic missiles. It did NOT refer to distances missiles flew or the spacing of deployed missiles.

Evaluate the statements you listed:
- “The USSR, according to a report, was ahead in ICBM technology.” — Close enough: reports (notably alarmist assessments like parts of the 1957 Gaither discussions and political rhetoric after Sputnik) claimed the Soviets were ahead in ICBMs. That is essentially what “missile gap” meant, though later intelligence showed those claims were exaggerated or wrong.
- “The Soviets had a lot fewer ICBMs than the United States.” — False as a description of the missile-gap claim. The worry was the opposite (that the Soviets had more); after better intelligence it turned out the U.S. actually had the advantage in ICBMs.
- “The distance ICBMs flew between continents was referred to as a ‘gap.’” — False.
- “The ‘gap’ referred to the distance between deployed missiles on the ground.” — False.

Brief context: the term arose after Sputnik (1957) and alarmist reports of Soviet capability. Politicians used it in campaigns. U-2 reconnaissance and subsequent intelligence estimates showed the Soviet ICBM force was smaller than feared, and the “gap” was largely a mistaken perception.