Rules for discharging disabled veterans, 1919

Question

INTRODUCTION

When World War I ended in 1918 more than 4.6 million men returned to the United States from war. The American people and the US government were unprepared to reintegrate and care for the men who returned with physical injuries and psychological damage that would affect veterans for the rest of their lives.

According to the Library of Congress, 224,000 soldiers returned home with a permanent physical or mental disability. Of the injured, 4,400 were amputees. Almost 100,000 soldiers had been removed from combat due to psychological injuries and 40,000 of them were subsequently discharged.1 With no government agency dedicated to veteran’s affairs at the time, responsibilities for veterans were scattered between several agencies. On January 29, 1919, “Rules for the Discharge of Disabled US Soldiers” were published in the Official US Bulletin, issued by the US War Department and the Office of the Surgeon General.

Despite the nation’s good intentions, disabled veterans were overwhelmed with confusing paperwork to fill out. Many WWI veterans faced unemployment, poor housing conditions, and inadequate medical care. As a result, veterans and other Americans founded organizations like the Disabled American Veterans of the World War and the American Legion to support and fight for the rights of disabled veterans. Their efforts led Congress to establish the US Veterans Bureau in 1921, which was a precursor to the Department of Veterans Affairs.

EXCERPTS

[“]It is the policy of the War Department to retain, so far as practicable under military control, for the purpose of medical and surgical treatment (a) officers and soldiers suffering from acute diseases or acute exacerbations of chronic diseases or unhealed lesions; (b) officers and soldiers suffering from communicable diseases or who are ‘carriers,’ whose discharge would be a danger to the civil community; (c) officers and soldiers suffering from disabilities incurred in the line of duty which are correctible within their terms of service or enlistment; (d) officers and soldiers suffering from chronic or permanent disabilities incurred in the line of duty, which are susceptible of improvement by measures for mental or physical reconstruction designed to fit them for return to their homes, for the resumption of their former vocations, or, with their consent, for the industrial opportunities or the training courses provided by the Federal Board for Vocational Education.

“In the accomplishment of this policy, it is the intention to restore officers and soldiers, who are held in service as provided above, to health and function as fully as possible, considering the nature of their disabilities, the limitations of the military service, and other provisions which the Government has made for the care of the permanently disabled.

Constructed Response Question
[Extended Response]

Shell shock–now known as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)–was not an unfamiliar result or side effect of war. The sheer numbers of men suffering from it during and after the war was staggering. Hypothesize if the government effectively address this issue? Support your claim with evidence from the source(s).

​

Answer 1

Hypothesis: The government did not effectively address the issue of shell shock (PTSD) among returning World War I veterans.

Evidence from the provided excerpts and historical context indicates that while the government acknowledged the need for medical and surgical treatment for injured soldiers, it lacked the necessary infrastructure, understanding, and resources to effectively address the psychological consequences of war, such as shell shock.

1. Lack of Comprehensive Policy for Psychological Conditions: The document emphasizes a policy focused on physical injuries and disabilities while primarily mentioning "officers and soldiers suffering from acute diseases or acute exacerbations of chronic diseases." Although it references the intention to restore veterans to health, it does so with an implicit bias towards physical ailments. The mention of chronic or permanent disabilities that could improve with reconstruction efforts does not specifically address the vast psychological trauma experienced by many veterans. The absence of explicit language regarding mental health treatment reflects a significant gap in the government’s approach to addressing psychological injuries.

2. Inadequate Infrastructure for Veterans: The introduction highlights the disarray in managing the reintegration of veterans returning from World War I, with responsibilities scattered among various agencies. The fact that there was no dedicated agency for the care of veterans at the time compounded the challenges faced by those dealing with both physical and psychological injuries. The subsequent formation of advocacy groups like the Disabled American Veterans of the World War and the American Legion was a reaction to governmental shortcomings. These organizations emerged because the government had not constructed a comprehensive system for the proper treatment and support of veterans, particularly those suffering from psychological issues.

3. Overwhelming Bureaucracy: The excerpt notes that veterans were "overwhelmed with confusing paperwork." This bureaucratic complexity diverted attention from the urgent medical and psychological care many required. For veterans suffering from shell shock, navigating a complicated discharge process and bureaucracy could exacerbate their mental health issues rather than facilitate their recovery.

4. Delayed Response to Veteran Needs: The establishment of the US Veterans Bureau in 1921, as mentioned in the introduction, signaled a late recognition of the need for a more cohesive approach to veteran affairs. However, many veterans faced unemployment, poor housing, and inadequate medical care during the interim period. This delay in institutional support meant that the psychological needs of veterans, particularly those suffering from PTSD, went unaddressed for critical years following their return.

In conclusion, while there were intentions articulated in the policies of the time to support the rehabilitation of soldiers, the government’s actions were insufficient for addressing the psychological trauma of shell shock. The lack of a focused approach, the overwhelming bureaucracy veterans faced, and a delayed institutional response all contributed to the ineffective treatment of this significant issue.